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NOTE
ELECTION LAW: Limitations on Independent PACs Held
Unconstitutional. Federal Election Commission v. National
Conservative Political Action Committee, 105 S. Ct. 1459
(1985).
Section 9012(f)1 of the Presidential Election Campaign
Fund Act (Fund Act)2 prohibits unauthorized committees3
from making expenditures exceeding $1,000 to further the
election of a publicly funded presidential candidate in the gen-
eral election.4 In Federal Election Commission v. National
Conservative Political Action Committee (FEC v. NCPA C),5
the United States Supreme Court found 6 that the expenditures
1. 26 U.S.C. § 9012(f) (1982). This section provides in part:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any political committee which is not an authorized
committee with respect to the eligible candidates of a political party for Presi-
dent and Vice President in a presidential election knowingly and willfully to
incur expenditures to further the election of such candidates, which would con-
stitute qualified campaign expenses if incurred by an authorized committee of
such candidates, in an aggregate amount exceeding $1,000 ...
It further provides for criminal penalties in the form of fines and imprisonment for
violators of this section. A political committee shall be fined up to $5,000 for violation
and any officer or member of a committee who knowingly and willfully consents to such
a violation, and any other individual who knowingly or willfully violates this section
shall be fined up to $5,000 or imprisoned not more than one year or both. Id.
2. Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9013 (1982). This
statute offers the Presidential candidates of major political parties the option of receiv-
ing public financing for their general election campaigns. If a Presidential candidate
elects public financing, § 9012(0 makes it a criminal offense for independent "political
committees," such as the National Conservative Political Action Committee, to expend
more than $1,000 to further that candidate's election. FEC v. NCPAC, 105 S. Ct. 1459,
1461 (1985).
3. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION RECORD (GPO), at 6 (May 1985). Unau-
thorized committees are defined as those which are independent from a candidate's cho-
sen committee. Id.
4. Id.
5. 105 S. Ct. 1459 (1985). Two separate actions were consolidated in this case. See
infra text accompanying notes 15-23.
6. This decision consisted of two parts. The first issue concerned whether the Dem-
ocrats had "standing" to bring suit against NCPAC and FCM. The Supreme Court
held that they lacked standing. For further information as to the Court's opinion on
this issue, see FEC v. NCPAC, 105 S. Ct. at 1462-65. The second issue involved the
constitutionality of § 9012(0, which is the focus of this article. Id. at 1465-71.
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at issue constituted speech; therefore, they were protected
under the first amendment.7 The Court, in a seven to two de-
cision,8 declared section 9012(f) unconstitutional because the
prohibited conduct was entitled to first amendment protec-
tion9 and no compelling state interest justified the prohibi-
tion.'0 The provision was also found to be overbroad."
This note begins with a synopsis of the facts in FEC v.
NCPAC. Next, the development of campaign finance regula-
tions is discussed, followed by an analysis of the Court's deci-
sion in FEC v. NCPAC. Finally, this note considers the
impact of this decision within the electoral process and sug-
gests that the Court adopt a more consistent approach in this
area of election law.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Section 9012(f), the provision limiting political expendi-
tures at issue in FEC v. NCPAC, was previously challenged
and found invalid in Common Cause v. Schmitt. 2 The
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in
Schmitt by a four to four vote. 13 Schmitt, therefore, had no
precedential value. 14
In May 1983, the Democratic Party, the Democratic Na-
tional Committee (DNC), and Edward Mezvinsky 15 filed suit
against the National Conservative Political Action Committee
7. Id. at 1467.
8. Justice Rehnquist delivered the Court's two part opinion. Justices Burger,
Blackmun, Powell, and O'Connor joined in Part I. Justices Burger, Brennan, Black-
mun, Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor joined in Part II. Id. at 1459.
9. Id. at 1467-68.
10. Id. at 1469-71.
11. Id. at 1469-70.
12. 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C. 1980), ajffd per curiam, 455 U.S. 129 (1982) (4-4
decision).
13. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision. Common
Cause v. Schmitt, 455 U.S. at 129.
14. Peck, Statutory Limits on Campaign Financing: A Boon or A Boondoggle? 7
PREVIEW OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES 153, 154 (1984).
15. FEC v. NCPAC, 105 S. Ct. at 1462. Edward Mezvinsky served as Chairman of
the Pennsylvania Democratic State Committee at the time of this litigation. He sued in
his individual capacity as a citizen eligible to vote for President of the United States. Id.
Mezvinsky did not pursue an appeal to the Supreme Court, though his name was inad-
vertently included in the notice of appeal filed by the Democratic Party and the DNC.
Id. at 1462 n.I.
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(NCPAC) 16 and the Fund for a Conservative Majority
(FCM),17 which had announced their intention to spend large
sums to help bring about the reelection of President Ronald
Reagan in 1984.18 They sought a declaration that section
9012(f) was constitutional. 19 The FEC along with the political
action committees (PACs),z° intervened for the sole purpose
of moving, to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing.2
The FEC brought a separate action against the same de-
fendants seeking identical declaratory relief in June 1983. 2
The two cases were consolidated by a three-judge district
court.23 The district court held that the Democratic Party
and the DNC had standing to sue and that section 9012(f)
abridges the first amendment freedoms of speech and associa-
tion and is substantially overbroad. 24
The FEC appealed that part of the judgment which held
that the Democratic Party and the DNC had standing.2 The
Democratic Party and the DNC challenged that part of the
holding concerning section 9012(f).26 The United States
16. Id. at 1465. NCPAC is a nonprofit, nonmembership corporation formed in
August 1975 and registered with the FEC as a political committee. It is governed by a
three-member board of directors which is elected annually by the existing board. Its
contributors have no direct role in the decisions concerning campaign strategies or
which candidates the NCPAC will support. It raises money through direct mail solici-
tations. Id.
17. Id. FCM is registered with the FEC as a multicandidate political committee.
Its organization is similar to the NCPAC. See supra note 16.
18. 105 S. Ct. at 1462.
19. Id. In the 1980 election, the Presidential Election Campaign Fund made $29.4
million available in public funds to each of the two major party candidates. In addition,
independent political committees spent $13.7 million on behalf of the two candidates.
$13 million of these independent expenditures were used to support the election of Ron-
ald Reagan. Peck, supra note 14, at 153.
20. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS EDUCATION FUND, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOT-
ERS OF THE UNITED STATES, PUB. No. 297, FACTS ON PACS: POLITICAL ACTION
COMMITrEES AT AMERICAN CAMPAIGN FINANCE 3 (1984) [hereinafter cited as FACTS
ON PACS]. The term "political action committee" refers to nonparty, noncandidate
political committees which are referred to as "nonconnected committees" in the Federal
Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971. The FECA also speaks of "separate, segre-
gated funds" which also refers to the PACs. Id.
21. FEC v. NCPAC, 105 S. Ct. at 1462.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1461. The companion law suits were brought before a three-judge Dis-
trict Court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
24. Id. at 1462.
25. Id. at 1461.
26. Id.
1985]
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Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction pursuant to the
statutory appeal provision of section 901 1(b)(2). 27 The Court
reversed the judgment of the district court on the issue of
standing but affirmed its judgment as to section 9012(0, thus
holding that section unconstitutional.28
I. BACKGROUND
A. Development of Campaign Regulations
The Progressives ushered in the first major campaign fi-
nance regulations in the United States.29 During the 1970's,
increased media costs, 30 the Watergate scandal, 31 and a grow-
ing desire to provide equal access to the electoral process 32
provided further impetus for reform.33 By the middle of the
decade, three major pieces of campaign finance legislation had
been passed.34
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) was
the first major piece of federal campaign legislation since the
27. Id. at 1462. 26 U.S.C. § 901 1(b)(2) (1982), provides in part:
The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction of proceedings
instituted pursuant to this subsection and shall exercise the same without regard
to whether a person asserting right under provisions of this subsection shall have
exhausted any administrative or other remedies that may be provided at law.
Such proceedings shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges...
and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.
Id.
28. FEC v. NCPAC, 105 S. Ct. at 1459.
29. D. ADAMANY & G. AGREE, POLITICAL MONEY: A STRATEGY FOR CAM-
PAIGN FINANCING IN AMERICA 43 (1975) [hereinafter cited as POLITICAL MONEY].
30. H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1980 ELECTION 103 (1983). Political
campaigning consists largely of communications. Communication costs have grown in
the last two decades as has all political spending. See also CONGRESSIONAL QUAR-
TERLY INC., DOLLAR POLITICS 1-27 (3d ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as DOLLAR
POLITICS].
31. ALEXANDER, supra note 30, at 7. The Watergate scandal and its aftermath
created the environment for Congress to strengthen the campaign fianance laws through
the enactment of a series of amendments. The 1974 FECA amendments provided for
public funding, presidential prenomination campaigns and national nominating conven-
tions. The amendments also established a number of contribution and expenditure lim-
its for federal candidates and political committees. Id.
32. For a discussion of the first amendment interest in equal access, see Nicholson,
Buckley v. Valeo: The Constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amend-
ments of 1974, 77 WIs. L. REv. 323, 334-40 (1977).
33. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., ELECTIONS '84, at 147 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as ELECTIONS '84].
34. Id.
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1925 Corrupt Practices Act. 35 FECA was amended in 1974,
1976 and 1979.36 The present role of PACs in the political
process is the result of the interaction of numerous factors,
one of which includes legislative acts and the courts' interpre-
tation of them. 7
B. Development of PACs
1. Pre-FECA
The connected PACs developed as a result of the federal
prohibition against direct corporate, national bank and labor
union contributions to federal candidates.3 8 The first modem
PAC was organized in 1943. 39 Following the success of these
early committees, the number of labor union PACs in-
creased.40 To a lesser degree, corporate and other business-
oriented PACs developed committees of their own.41
2. Post-FECA
FECA authorized the establishment and administration of
separate, segregated funds by unions and corporations.42 This
institutionalized the PAC concept. It wasn't until FECA was
amended in 1974, however, that PAC growth occurred.4 3 An
advisory opinion issued in 1975 by the FEC legitimized corpo-
35. FACTS ON PACs, supra note 20, at 1.
36. Id. at 1-2.
37. Id. at 2. For further discussion of this interaction, see DOLLAR POLmcs,
supra note 30, at 79-89.
38. FACTS ON PACs, supra note 20, at 3. Connected PACs are those which have a
sponsoring organization such as a labor union or corporation.
39. Id. The first modern political action committee was organized by the Congress
of Industrial Organizations and was called the CIO-PAC. Id.
40. Id. at 4. By the time FECA was enacted, there were nearly 40 national labor
PACs as well as many other PACs organized at the state and local levels. Id.
41. Id. Before the campaign finance reforms of the 1970's, the common pattern for
corporate executives was to make political contributions on a personal basis. Corpora-
tions were prohibited from giving directly to federal candidates. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. In 1971, there were 113 PACs. In 1975, that number had grown to 608
PACs. However, the 1974 Amendent eliminated corporate concern about the legality
of corporations with government contracts establishing political action committees us-
ing corporate funds. Therefore, by 1983 the number of PACs had risen to 3,525. Id.
1985]
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rate PAC activity.' This led to a greater expansion of the use
of PACs in the American electoral process.45
Another important event in the development of PACs was
the Buckley v. Valeo46 decision in 1976. The Buckley Court
upheld FECA's limitations on contributions to candidates and
struck down, as unconstitutional, its limitations on independ-
ent expenditures.47 Since that time, this system of campaign
financing has been challenged in the courts on numerous occa-
sions a.4  Recent attempts to change these laws have not been
very effective.49 Therefore, further reforms are unlikely.50
C. Influence of Ideological PACs
About 500 political committees fall within a unique, catch
all category called non-connected PACs.5 Unlike most other
PACs,52 the principal interests of the leading non connected
PACs are ideological. 3 This has added a different flavor to
the campaigns and elections of the 1980's.5 4 Today's ideologi-
cal PACs are larger and raise more money than most other
types of PACs.5 5 Ideological PACs tend to spend less on cam-
paigns but incur greater debts than other other types of
44. Id. at 5. This advisory opinion was issued in response to a query from Sun Oil
Company. The FEC assured the corporation that its SunPAC was a legal separate,
segregated fund and that it could solicit voluntary contributions from its employees as
well as make contributions to federal candidates. Id.
45. Id. at 5-6.
46. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). For a more comprehensive coverage of the various issues in
Buckley, see Comment, Buckley v. Valeo: The Supreme Court and Federal Campaign
Reform, 76 COLUM. L. Rv. 852 (1976).
47. FEC v. NCPAC, 105 S. Ct. at 1466.
48. For a discussion of this election law litigation, see Alexander, supra note 30, at
67-95.
49. See DOLLAR POLITICS, supra note 30, at 17-27.
50. For a discussion of the recent legislative initiatives concerning campaign fi-
nance reform, see ELECTIONS '84, supra note 33, at 149-55.
51. Id. at 143.
52. Other types of PACs include those organized by unions, corporations, coopera-
tives, trade, membership, and health associations. Id.
53. Id.
54. Latus, Assessing Ideological PACs: From Outrage to Understanding, MONEY
AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 142 (M. Malbin ed. 1984).
55. Id. at 143-44. For more information on expenditures by political action com-
mittees during the 1983-84 election cycle, see FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, 18-
MONTH PAC STUDY (1984).
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PACs. 6 This is not surprising since the other types of PACs
are permitted to have their fund-raising and overhead costs
paid by their sponsoring organizations.
Another major difference between ideological and other
PACs is that ideological PACs are more willing to conduct
independent expenditure campaigns.5 The Supreme Court in
Buckley struck down a 1974 provision of FECA which had
restricted independent expenditures to $1,000 per candidate.
Recently, this has been viewed by some to be a loophole in
FECA and certain ideological PACs have extensively used in-
dependent expenditures to further their objectives.5 9 This ex-
tensive use of independent expenditures in the electoral
process, especially in publicly funded presidential campaigns,
is the central issue in FEC v. NCPAC.6°
III. THE FEC v. NCPAC OPINIONS
4. The Majority
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, first estab-
lished that the independent expenditures made by the PACs in
this case were prohibited by section 9012(f). 6 1 The Court then
considered whether this section violates the first amend-
ment. 2 Drawing a parallel between this case and its earlier
decision in Buckley v. Valeo,6 3 the Court found that the ex-
penditures at issue constituted "speech" and, therefore, de-
served protection so that various political views could be
adequately expressed. 5
56. Latus, supra note 54, at 144. Ideological PACs mainly use direct mail fundrais-
ing which usually requires spending at least 50 cents to raise a dollar. Id. The PACs in
FEC v. NCPAC used this technique to raise money. 105 S. Ct. at 1465.
57. Latus, supra note 54, at 144.
58. Id. at 149.
59. Id. See also DOLLAR PoLmcs, supra note 30, at 99.
60. See infra text accompanying notes 61-68.
61. FEC v. NCPAC, 105 S. Ct. at 1466-67. For a discussion of the Court's analy-
sis, see id. at 1465-67.
62. Id. at 1467-68. For a discussion of the Buckley decision and the constitutional-
ity of FECA as well as a scholarly reaction to it, see generally Nicholson, supra note 32.
63. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). See FEC v. NCPAC, 105 S. Ct. at 1467.
64. 105 S. Ct. at 1467.
65. Today, effective political speech depends upon the use of expensive modes of
media. For further explanation of the Court's view on this topic, see id.
1985]
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The Court noted that not only are these independent ex-
penditures necessary to be politically effective, but they also
represent an individual's right to free speech and association.66
The Court rejected the notion that the PACs' form of organi-
zation or methods of solicitation diminished their entitlement
to first amendment protection. 67 The Court also rejected the
argument that these contributions were "speech by proxy"
and, therefore, not entitled to the protection guaranteed to in-
dividual speech.68 Of particular concern to the Court was the
potential inability of individuals with modest means to effec-
tively broadcast their political views.69
The Court distinguished FEC v. NCPAC from other cases
in which FECA restrictions on corporate contributions were
upheld.70  This is consistent with the Court's past decisions
which have held that legislative regulation of corporate contri-
butions to candidates is constitutional.71
Having concluded that the independent expenditures de-
served first amendment protection, the Court turned its atten-
tion to whether there was a sufficient government interest
served by section 9012(0 to justify its prohibitions.7 2
66. 105 S. Ct at 1467-68. For further discussion as to the protection given speech
so as to assure the unfettered interchange of ideas, see Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 484 (1957).
67. 105 S. Ct. at 1467. The Court said that freedom of association was certainly
implicated in this case. NCPAC and FCM are mechanisms by which large numbers of
individuals with modest means can join together to be politically effective. Id. See also
Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295-96 (1981); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976).
68. 105 S. Ct. at 1468. The FEC advanced this theory based on California Medical
Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981). The Court rejected this argument on the basis that
the present case involved limitations on expenditures by PACs, not on the contributions
they receive. Also, the contributions to NCPAC and FCM were relatively small and
thus did not raise the same concerns as the sizeable contributions involved in California
Medical Ass'n. FEC v. NCPAC, 105 S. Ct. at 1467-68.
69. 105 S. Ct. at 1467. See also supra note 67.
70. The Court considers its prior holding in FEC v. National Right to Work
Comm. 459 U.S. 197 (1982) to be distinguishable from its determination in the present
case. It points to the historical differences between the treatment accorded corporations
and other organizations. In return for the special advantages given to individuals acting
jointly through corporations, those individuals forego some of the rights they would
have had if they had acted in their individual capacity. FEC v. NCPAC, 105 S. Ct. at
1468.
71. 105 S. Ct. at 1468.
72. Id. at 1468-69.
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In Buckley, the Court held that "preventing corruption or
the appearance of corruption are the only legitimate and com-
pelling governmental interests thus far identified for restrict-
ing campaign financing."73 Applying the same standard in the
present case, the Court found that the restriction imposed by
section 9012(f) could not be upheld74 as there appeared to be
no "quidpro quo."" Even if NCPAC and FCM were a poten-
tial source of corruption, section 9012(f) was found to be fa-
tally overbroad.76 The Court determined that it could not
limit section 9012(f) in order to save it. 7 7
Finally, the Court discussed the role of the legislature in
determining what measures are necessary to control campaign
finance and its corrupting influence.78 The Court drew a dis-
tinction between groups that are organized expressly to par-
ticipate in political debate and those which are formed for
economic gain.79 While noting that at times the Court does
defer to the legislature, it found no justifiable reason to do so
in this situation and struck down section 9012(f) as unconsti-
tutional on its face.80
B. The Dissents
1. The White Dissent
Justice White, in his dissenting opinion, states that he be-
lieves that Buckley was incorrectly decided.81 He believes that
73. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 22. See also Citizens Against Rent Control v.
Berkley, 454 U.S. 290, 297 (1981). Of course, as Justice Marshall indicates in his dis-
senting opinion, there is perhaps a legitimate governmental interest in promoting equal
access to the political arena. FEC v. NCPAC, 105 S. Ct. at 1481 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
74. 105 S. Ct. at 1468-69. Weighing heavy in the majority opinion was the absence
of prearrangement and coordination between the PACs and the candidates which they
chose to support or oppose. Id. at 1469.
75. Quid pro quo is defined here to mean dollars for political favors. Id.
76. The Court found § 9012(f) fatally overbroad because it not only applied to
"multimillion dollar war chests" but also to informal neighborhood organizations. 105
S. Ct. at 1470.
77. For a discussion of the ways the Court considered limiting § 9012(0 and their
rationale for determining that such a limitation was not possible, see id.
78. 105 S. Ct. at 1470-71.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1471.
81. 105 S. Ct. at 1474 (White, J., dissenting).
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governmental interests justify congressional regulation of the
amassing and spending of money in political campaigns . 2
Next, White contends that even if Buckley was correct, the
majority misapplied it to the present case. 3 He believes that
section 9012(f) more closely resembles the contribution limita-
tions upheld in Buckley than the limitations on uncoordinated
individual expenditures that were struck down. 4 White also
believes that the entire public financing scheme is injured by
the majority's holding.85 He asserts that by striking down one
part of an integrated and comprehensive statute, the Court
has "transformed a coherent regulatory scheme into a nonsen-
sical, loophole-ridden patchwork.
86
2. The Marshall Dissent
Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion, indicates his
change in position on the contribution/expenditure distinc-
tion. 7 He cites two factors which were used to justify this
distinction in Buckley: first, that independent expenditures of-
fer significantly less potential for abuse than contributions;88
second, that protected constitutional interests exist under the
first amendment.8 9
82. Justice White agrees that this case involves first amendment concerns, but be-
lieves that there are other interests to justify restrictions. Id.
83. Id. A major distinction between the majority and dissenting opinions in this
case involves the classification of the independent expenditures at issue. The majority
considers them to be similiar to the "expenditures" struck down in Buckley. Id. at
1466. Justice White considers them to be more like "contributions." Id. at 1474 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). Marshall no longer believes any distinction should be drawn be-
tween expenditures and contributions and thus their classification does not matter. Id.
at 1486 (White, J., dissenting). See generally id. at 1465-81.
84. Id. at 1474. One of the most common criticisms of the Buckley opinion is its
distinction between expenditure and contribution limitations. See Nicholson, supra
note 32 at 323-33; Comment, supra note 46, at 874.
85. 105 S. Ct. at 1480.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1480-81 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
88. Justice Marshall rejected the notion that a distinction exists between contribu-
tions and expenditures. Realistically, he does not believe such a distinction can be
drawn. Id. at 1481.
89. Justice Marshall believes that the limitations on contributions and expenditures
have a similar impact on first amendment freedoms. Therefore, to say that one can be
restricted and the other cannot be restricted is inconsistent. Id.
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Marshall is no longer convinced that this distinction is ac-
curate.9" He believes that the independent expenditures chal-
lenged in Buckley and FEC v. NCPAC can be justified by the
governmental interests in promoting equal access to the polit-
ical arena.91
IV. ANALYSIS
In the United States, as in other democratic nations, polit-
ical activity has traditionally been financed through private,
voluntary contributions. 92 Therefore, the concept of public
funding in political campaigns has met with strong opposi-
tion.93 In recent years, the Court has played a greater role in
the development of this area of election law.94  FEC v.
NCPAC95 indicates the difficulty the Court has had in devel-
oping a consistent approach toward the role of public financ-
ing in the American electoral process.96
A. Equal Access
One criticism of the Buckley decision was its failure to ad-
dress the first amendment interest in equalizing access and in-
put into the political arena.97 The Court failed to adequately
address this issue in FEC v. NCPAC as well.
While a major impetus for the reforms of the 1970's was
the desire to prevent corruption, it was not the only one.9
90. Id. In Buckley, three of the eight Justices who heard the case agreed that con-
tributions and expenditures should be treated the same for first amendment purposes.
See 424 U.S. 1.
91. 105 S. Ct. at 1481.
92. POLrIcAL MONEY, supra note 29, at 2.
93. For a discussion of the role of money in a democratic society, see id. at 1-27.
94. For other recent cases involying similiar issues, see California Medical Ass'n v.
FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981); Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkley, 454 U.S. 290
(1981); Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C. 1980), aff'dper cutam,
455 U.S. 129 (1982) (4-4 decision).
95. 105 S. Ct. 1459 (1985).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 61-91. The Court is correct in its conclu-
sion that first amendment rights are at stake in FEC v. NCPAC, and its evaluation of
the freedom of association implications are appropriate. Where the Court falls short in
its analysis is in its failure to take a comprehensive view of the situation. The independ-
ent expenditures at issue represent the interaction that exists between contributions and
expenditures. Therefore, the Court's failure to fully address that interaction in its opin-
ion only serves to further confuse the law surrounding campaign finance regulations.
97. Comment, supra note 46, at 854.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 30-33.
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The dissenting opinions99 express a greater understanding of
the complexities behind the campaign reform movement.
Certainly a valid consideraton is the practical effect of sev-
eral significant parts of FECA and the Fund Act being de-
clared unconstitutional. The loopholes which remain can
create an undesirable political climate. Even worse, however,
is the legal environment which emerges. Money, time and ef-
fort are channeled into legal battles with little remaining for
the effective and complete discussion of the issues and candi-
dates. Other repercussions, mostly undesirable, are also felt
throughout the electoral process. 1°° As a result, access is
decreased.
The Court needs to recognize that there are other legiti-
mate governmental interests for restricting campaign fi-
nances.101 Failure to recognize these competing interests
shows the Court's failure to completely address the issues in-
volved in this case.
B. Contribution and Expenditure Limits
In FEC v. NCPAC, the Court considered the independent
expenditures at issue to be similiar to the expenditures struck
down in Buckley.102 Marshall's dissenting opinion directly at-
tacks the artificial nature of the distinction drawn between
contributions and expenditures. 10 3 White, in his dissenting
opinion, further confuses the distinction by claiming that the
expenditures at issue are really "contributions.'104
It appears that the issue is not whether the independent
expenditures are really contributions or expenditures, but
rather whether the Court wishes to declare them constitu-
tional or not. If the Court believes that the restrictions should
remain part of the statutory scheme,.it will call them contribu-
99. The dissenting opinions in FEC v. NCPAC were given by Justices White and
Marshall. See supra text accompanying notes 81-91.
100. The reforms were criticized because they diverted campaign funds from com-
municating with voters to complying with the law. They also were seen as a boon to
incumbents and were responsible for longer campaigns. ELECTIONS '84, supra note 33,
at 149.
101. FEC v. NCPAC, 105 S. Ct. at 1468.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1480-81 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 1477-78 (White, J., dissenting).
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tions. If not, it will call them expenditures. What the Court
fails to realize is the interrelationship between contributions
and expenditures. 10 5 It is this interrelationship that makes it
difficult to know how to categorize some of the financial trans-
actions which occur during a campaign. It is for this reason
that the Court should decline the future use of this distinction
and apply, on a case-by-case basis, factors which represent the
legitimate governmental interests served by such restrictions.
In deciding what campaign regulatory scheme will apply,
the Court must first balance the interests of society against the
rights of the individual. It must then determine if the current
means of effectuating that balance is proper.10 6 Among the
factors to be considered are:
(1) The individual's rights to participate in political activ-
ity and freely express his or her political viewpoints;
(2) The individual's constitutional rights of freedom of
speech and association;
(3) The prevention of corruption or the appearance of such
corruption;
(4) Society's interest in providing equal access to the polit-
ical arena for all individuals;
(5) The desire to establish a system of public financing in
campaigns that is both effective and fair; and
(6) The legislative intent behind any statutory section at
issue. 107
105. Comment, supra note 46, at 874.
106. Although the Constitution does not explicitly authorize the national regula-
tion of campaigns, the Supreme Court has employed several constitutional provisions to
justify its decisions in this area. For a discussion of campaign regulation and the Con-
stitution, see POLITICAL MONEY, supra note 29, at 62-64.
107. These factors represent the basic concepts the Court should consider in its
determinaton of whether the legislature has chosen the proper means to regulate cam-
paign financing. See generally PoLmICAL MONEY, supra note 29, at 187.
The Court does consider the first amendment and its application to the PAC ex-
penditures in this case. FEC v. NCPAC, 105 S. Ct. at 1467-68. Yet, the Court falls
short in its consideration of first amendment rights by not clearly identifying whose
interests it is protecting. Id. at 1477 (White, J., dissenting).
The majority compares the limitations imposed by the statute at issue to "allowing a
speaker in a public hall to express his views while denying him the use of an amplifying
system." Id. at 1467. The majority contends that the first amendment affords broad
protection of political expression in order to assure the unfettered interchange of polit-
ical and social ideas. Id.
White, in his dissent, agrees with the majority that the expenditures in this case
"produce" speech but explains that to "produce" speech is not "speech" itself. There-
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C. Impact
FEC v. NCPAC will have an impact upon potential expan-
sion of ideological PACs in the electoral process. Without
doubt, the Court's ruling in this case strengthened and further
legitimatized the "ideological" PACs.1 18 It is too early to pre-
dict what type of influence these PACs will have on the electo-
ral process. To date, conservative ideological PACs have been
more visible and active than their liberal counterparts. How-
ever, the liberal activists have seen the influence that ideologi-
cal PACs can have on elections and are likely to become more
active in this way.° 9 After all, the decision in FEC v. NCPA C
applies not only to conservative ideological PACs but to lib-
eral ones as well.110
V. CONCLUSION
FEC v. NCPAC represents a difficult proposition which
currently confronts our elected officials and judges. How can
one balance the rights of the individual against the interests of
society and yet provide an effective and fair electoral process?
The Court's decision in FEC v. NCPAC to declare section
9012(0 unconstitutional is a poor decision because the Court
failed to use a reasonable and comprehensive approach to
reach its decision. The Court should strongly consider devel-
fore, White argues that the first amendment protections should not extend to the ex-
penditures at issue in this case. Id. at 1475 (White, J., dissenting).
The prevention of corruption, or appearance thereof, has long been considered a
legitimate government function. Id. at 1469. See also text accompanying notes 73-79.
In this case, the Court places an overriding emphasis on this factor and fails to consider
other factors which are also legitimate and substantial.
Marshall, in his dissent, notes the congressional interest in promoting "the reality
and appearance of equal access" in the American political system. 105 S. Ct. at 1481
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23 (1976)).
The White dissent further notes that the desire to maintain public confidence in the
integrity of federal elections equalizes the resources available to candidates and holds
the overall amount of money devoted to campaigns at a reasonable level. This creates a
public financing system that is both effective and fair. These objectives are considered
both legitimate and substantial. Id. at 1475 (White, J., dissenting).
108. The ideological PACs were legitimized by this decision much like earlier cor-
porate and labor PACs were legitimized by other Court decisions and FEC advisory
opinions. See supra text accompanying note 44.
109. Latus, supra note 54, at 165-66.
110. The ruling in FEC v. NCPAC will likely encourage greater activity by both
liberal and conservative ideological PACs in the 1986 and 1988 elections. An equaliza-
tion between the relative strengths of the various PACs is likely to occur.
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oping an approach that would balance the competing interests
involved in campaign finance regulations and apply it on a
case-by-case basis. No longer should the artificial distinction
drawn between expenditures and contributions be used to
make this determination. A consistent approach by the judici-
ary could help to stabilize this area of election law."'
ANNE M. MORGAN
111. There are various factors which the Court could consider in balancing the
competing interests involved in campaign finance regulations in order to develop a more
consistent approach in evaluating cases in this area of election law. See supra text ac-
companying note 107.
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